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Friends of Animals v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service, 879 F.3d 
1000 (9th Cir. 2018) 
 
Bradley E. Tinker 
 
In Friends of Animals v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the plain language of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
allows for the removal of one species of bird to benefit another species. 
Friends of Animals argued that the Service’s experiment permitting the 
taking of one species––the barred owl––to advance the conservation of a 
different species––the northern spotted owl––violated the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act. The court, however, found that the Act delegates broad 
implementing discretion to the Secretary of the Interior, and neither the 
Act nor the underlying international conventions limit the taking of a 
particular species to enhance conservation of another species. In affirming 
the district court’s ruling, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Service’s 
conclusions and granted summary judgment in their favor. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Friends of Animals and Predator Defense (collectively, “Friends”) 
are non-profit organizations advocating for animals protected by the 
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
(“MBTA”), along with other conventions.1 In 2014, Friends challenged a 
Fish and Wildlife Service (“Service”) scientific collecting permit, arguing 
that the permit violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) 
and the MBTA. Friends argued that the Service's permit, which allowed 
the taking of one bird to benefit another, was unlawful because neither the 
MBTA nor any foundational migratory bird conventions expressly allow 
the Service to take a migratory bird unless to advance conservation of that 
species.2 The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, however, 
granted summary judgment for the  Service. 3 Friends appealed pressing 
only the MBTA claim. 4 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s 
decision and granted summary judgment for the Service on three main 
grounds.5 First, MBTA language did not support Friends’ argument.6 
Second, the underlying convention protecting owls––the Mexico 
Convention––failed to support Friends’ argument.7 Lastly, the court 
                                                     
1. Friends of Animals v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 879 F.3d 
1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 2018). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 1002. 
4. Id. at 1003. 
5. Id. at 1010. 
6. Id. at 1004.  
7. Id. at 1007.  
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determined that “slippery slope” concerns over the Service’s action were 
ufounded because adequate and proper backstops were in place.8 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 1990, the Service determined the northern spotted owl (“NSO”) 
was a threatened species under the ESA.9 NSO population decline 
primarily tracked removal of old-growth forest, their principal habitat. 
Remaining NSO populations suffered further when barred owls, native to 
the eastern United States, began encroaching on increasingly scarce NSO 
habitat from the east.10 Because of the barred owl’s better adaptability, it 
eventually came to greatly outnumber the NSO and consume up to 76 
percent of the two species’ shared diet.11 Barred owls even began 
physically attacking NSOs at times.12 Consequently, NSO populations 




In 2008, the Service created a recovery plan for the NSO.14 The 
Service acknowledged that habitat destruction was responsible for the 
decline in the NSO population..15 Although that plan focused significantly 
on habitat preservation, the Service also concluded that, “the barred owl 
constitutes a significantly greater threat to spotted owl recovery than was 
envisioned when the spotted owl was listed in 1990,” and, “[a]s a result, 
the Service recommend[ed] specific actions to address the barred owl 
threat.”16 In areas of greatest NSO concentration, the Service planned to 
remove barred owls and determine the effects of that change on NSO site 
occupancy, reproduction, and survival.17 In 2014, the Service granted the 
Oregon Fish and Wildlife Office a scientific collecting permit for 1,600 
barred owls.18  
 
B. The Four International Conventions On Migratory Birds 
 
The MBTA references four conventions for the protection of 
migratory birds with Canada, Mexico, Russia, and Japan.19 Each 
convention is a bilateral treaty between the United States and one specific 
                                                     
8. Id. at 1008. 
9. Id. at 1001. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 1002. 
13. Id. at 1001. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 1002. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 1004. 
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country.20 The Mexico Convention is the only one that provides protection 
for owls, and as such, the Mexico Convention was the only convention 
analyzed by the Court.21 Article II of the Mexico Convention establishes 
“close[d] seasons” that prohibit taking migratory birds during certain 
seasons, with an exception under three circumstances, one of which allows 
taking for scientific purposes.22 
 
C. Procedural Posture 
 
In 2014, Friends brought this suit claiming the Oregon Fish and 
Wildlife Office’s permit violated the National Environmental Policy Act 
(“NEPA”) and the MBTA.23 Friends dropped the NEPA aspect of their 
claim when they appealed to the Ninth Circuit.24 The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Service on both of Friends’ claims, and 
Friends appealed the ruling as it pertained to the MBTA. In its ruling, the 
district court concluded that Friends’ same-species theory was 
unsupported because “nothing in the MBTA or the international 
conventions it implements limits scientific purposes to the species 
taken.”25 
The main purpose of the recovery plan is to eliminate the barred 
owl from the most concentrated habitats of the NSO.26 Friends argued this 
does not constitute “use[d] for scientific research,” which Friends argued 
is the point of the “same-species theory” provision within the MBTA and 
underlying conventions.27 The group also contended that MBTA and 
Mexico Convention language does not allow the Service to grant the 
scientific collection permit because when the Service "permits take for 
scientific purposes, the action must be intended to advance the 
conservation or scientific understanding of the very species being taken."28 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment 
de novo and came to similar conclusions as the lower court on each of 
Friends’ arguments.29 The court first analyzed Friends’ argument in the 
context of the authority given to the Service and its broad discretion to 
grant the permit and interpret the meaning of the language of the MBTA.30 
Second, the court looked at the language of the Mexico Convention and 
                                                     
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 1005. 
23. Id. at 1003. 
24. Id. 
25. Id.  




30. Id. at 1003-1004. 
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whether there was a limitation to enforce same-species takings. 31 Third, 
the court held that the Service’s interpretation of “used’’ was consistent 
with the language in the Mexico Convention. 32 Lastly, the court found 
provisions in place to control the abuse of takings of species not listed on 
the scientific collection permit. 33 
A. Broad Discretion Under the MBTA 
The MBTA regulates takings for migratory birds, except as 
permitted by the act.34 Under 16 U.S.C. § 703(a), the Secretary of the 
Interior is “authorized and directed to determine” when the conventions 
may allow taking and thereby “adopts suitable regulations permitting and 
governing the same.”35 Also relevant was 50 C.F.R. 21.23, which governs 
the Service’s issuance of scientific collecting permits for the taking of 
birds for “scientific or educational purposes.” 36 Permits must describe 
“species and number of birds to be taken, the location of the collection, the 
purpose of the research, and the institution to which species will ultimately 
be donated.” 37 The section also specifies that this applies to all migratory 
birds, and that the birds must be donated and transferred to the public, 
scientific, or educational institution in compliance with the permit.38 
In reviewing the MBTA and the Secretary’s authority, the court 
found that the Act imposes few substantive conditions itself, but rather 
delegates to the Secretary broad discretion to implement the act.39 Further, 
neither the Act nor the regulation supported Friends’ same-species 
theory.40  
B. The Service’s Plan was Specimen-Specific, Not Same-Species 
Friends’ primary argument, its same-species theory, was that 
language in the Mexico Convention required the taking of a bird be only 
for scientific purposes regarding that bird, and that the MBTA’s 
consistency provisions mandated compliance with that requirement.41 The 
MBTA’s “consistency provisions” dictate that regulations are “subject to 
the provisions [of]” and must act to further the “purposes of the 
conventions.” 42 Friends relied on the Mexico Convention’s language in 
Article II(A) providing that the only exception for taking a migratory bird 
is when it is “used for scientific purposes, for propagation or for 
                                                     
31. Id. at 1005. 
32. Id. at 1006.  
33. Id. at 1008. 
34. Id. at 1003. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 1004. 
37. Id. at 1004. 
38. Id. 
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museums.” 43 Friends argued that because the Service’s NSO recovery 
plan required taking barred owls to help the NSO, such taking was 
therefore not for a scientific purpose specific to the barred owl, thus 
violating the convention.44  
Friends relied on language in the Mexico Convention as its sole 
cause of action, and argued that “used for scientific purposes” mandates 
that a permitted take must be of the same species listed in the permit and 
to advance the conservation of that species.45 Friends maintained that the 
language in the Mexico Convention bolstered their argument and provided 
a cause of action to protect the barred owl from being taken without 
benefiting conservation or scientific advancement of that particular 
species.46 In the Service recovery plan, the scientific purpose related to the 
NSO rather than the barred owl.47 Friends concluded and argued that the 
permit impermissibly allowed barred owl take, even though no scientific 
research was directed at that species.48  
The court bifurcated this argument into specimen-specific and 
same-species interpretations.49 Specimen-specific permits are allowable, 
but same-species permits are not under the Mexico Convention.50 
Examples of specimen-specific permits are those where migratory birds 
are taken for scientific purposes, such as studying human hearing (barn 
owl) and aerodynamics (hummingbird).51 In those cases, the scientific 
collection permits listed the species but had nothing to do with its 
advancement, yet the take still qualified as a permissible scientific 
purpose. The court found this analogous to the case at hand.52 
C. The Service’s Interpretation of “Used” Is Consistent With the 
Mexico Convention 
In distinguishing same-species from specimen-specific, the court 
analyzed the meaning of the word “used” in the phrase “used for scientific 
purposes.”53 First, the court analyzed the word “used” according to “its 
ordinary or natural meaning, concluding the Mexico Convention allows a 
bird to be “employed” even if it is “to procure its demise . . . [and it] . . . is 
not the subject of scientific experiment.”54 However, due to remaining 
                                                     
43. Id. at 1008. 
44. Id. at 1003. 
45. Id. at 1004-1005. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 1007. 
49. Id. at 1005. 
50. Id. at 1005. 
51. Id.  
52. Id. at 1007. 
53. Id. at 1008 (citing Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 113 S. Ct. 
2050 (1993)). 
54. Id. at 1006. 
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ambiguity after the plain meaning analysis, the court continued analyzing 
the meaning of “used.”55 
The court next reviewed the word “used” in the context of the rest 
of the Mexico Convention’s language because “interpretation of legal text 
is a holistic endeavor.”56 In doing so, the court concluded that “read in full 
context of Articles I and II, it clearly encompasses a controlled scientific 
study to save a threatened species covered by the Convention when that 
study” will have a negligible effect on the taken species population.57  
 Lastly, the court rejected Friends’ argument that the canon of 
noscitur a sociis compelled the same-species argument. Noscitur a sociis 
stands for the proposition that “words grouped in a list should be given 
related meaning.”58 Friends claimed that Article II(A)’s exception 
requires that the phrase “used for scientific purposes . . . be read to be 
limited by the other elements in that series,” such as “for propagation or 
for museums” because if one is taking a bird for propagation or for 
museums, it must be “used for the propagative or museum purpose;” 
thus, if a bird is taken for a scientific purpose, similar restrictions should 
apply by requiring the scientific purpose be for the bird taken. 59 
However, the court found the words “‘scientific purposes,’ 
‘propagation,’ and ‘museums’ are sufficiently distinct that there is no 
obvious common denominator among them” for the canon to apply.60 
Even if it did apply, the court held it failed to support Friends’ argument 
because such a reading would be contrary to the Mexico Convention’s 
Article I’s language that “articulate[s] aims to assure that protected 
‘species may not be exterminated.’”61 Thus, “to promote a broad set of 
uses” such a narrow reading of “scientific purposes” was unjustified.62  
D. The Service’s Interpretation Does Not Lead to A Slippery Slope 
Lastly, the court rejected Friends’ argument that “the Service’s 
loose definition of scientific purposes invites a slippery slope, and this 
position would allow for an entire migratory bird species to be 
exterminated so long as there is a scientific basis to do so.”63 The court 
agreed with the Service that there is a “backstop against Friends’ parade 
of horribles,” concluding that reading “Articles I and II of the Mexico 
Convention in concert, they require that parties ‘establish laws, regulations 
and provisions’ to assure that covered ‘species may not be 
exterminated.’”64 Therefore, the court concluded that the Mexico 
                                                     
55. Id. 
56. Id. (quotation omitted). 
57. Id. at 1007. 
58. Id. at 1008. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 1009. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 1008. 
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Convention’s conservation purpose could be achieved “without reading 
into it a same-species limitation that is unsupported by its text.”65 
The court again referred to the language of Articles I and II from 
the Mexico Convention, which explicitly requires that parties “establish 
laws, regulations, and provisions so that a species may not be 
exterminated.”66 The court concluded that this slippery-slope argument did 
not advance the issue of whether a permitted take is limited to the same-
species.67 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A major implication of the court’s holding is the broad level of 
agency discretion when interpreting statutes. Allowing the take of an 
animal without any scientific use required may result in agency overreach. 
So long as the courts use judicial boundaries, the taking of an endangered 





                                                     
65. Id. at 1009. 
66. Id.  
67. Id. 
